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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Objective:  It has  been  established  in  the  literature  that  workers  within  public  organisations  are intrinsi-
cally  motivated.  This  paper  is an empirical  study  of  the healthcare  sector  using  methods  of  qualitative
analysis  research,  which  aims  to answer  the  following  hypotheses:  1)  doctors  are intrinsically  moti-
vated;  2)  economic  incentives  and  control  policies  may  undermine  doctors’  intrinsic  motivation;  and
3)  well-designed  incentives  may  encourage  doctors’  intrinsic  motivation.
Method:  We  conducted  semi-structured  interviews  à-la-Bewley  with  16  doctors  from  Navarre’s  Health-
care Service  (Servicio  Navarro  de  Salud-Osasunbidea), Spain.  The  questions  were  based  on  current  theories
of intrinsic  motivation  and  incentives  to test  the hypotheses.  Interviewees  were  allowed  to  respond
openly  without  time  constraints.  Relevant  information  was  selected,  quantiﬁed  and  analysed  by using
the qualitative  concepts  of saturation  and  codiﬁcation.
Results: The  results  seem  to conﬁrm  the  hypotheses.  Evidence  supporting  hypotheses  1 and  2 was  gath-
ered  from  all  interviewees,  as well  as  indications  of  the  validity  of  hypothesis  3 based  on interviewees’
proposals  of  incentives.
Conclusions: The  conclusions  could  act  as  a guide  to support  the  optimal  design  of  incentive  policies  and
schemes  within  health  organisations  when  healthcare  professionals  are  intrinsically  motivated.
© 2016  SESPAS.  Published  by  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).






r  e  s  u  m  e  n
Objetivo:  Ha  sido  establecido  por la  literatura  que  los trabajadores  de  las  organizaciones  públicas  están
intrínsecamente  motivados.  Este  trabajo  es  un  estudio  empírico  en  el sector  sanitario  que  utiliza  métodos
de  investigación  del análisis  cualitativo,  cuyo  objetivo  es  tratar  de  dar respuesta  a las  siguientes  hipótesis:
1)  los médicos  son  agentes  motivados  intrínsecamente,  2) los incentivos  económicos  y las  políticas  de
control  pueden  minar  la  motivación  intrínseca  de  los  médicos,  y 3)  los incentivos  bien  disen˜ados  pueden
impulsar  la  motivación  intrínseca  de  los  médicos.
Método: Realizamos  entrevistas  semiestructuradas  à-la-Bewley  a 16  médicos  del  Servicio  Navarro  de
Salud-Osasunbidea.  Las preguntas  fueron  disen˜adas  siguiendo  las  teorías  existentes  sobre  motivación
intrínseca  e incentivos,  y con  el objetivo  de  responder  a las  hipótesis  planteadas.  Los  entrevistados
tuvieron  la oportunidad  de contestar  a  las  preguntas  sin  restricción  de  tiempo.  La información  relevante
para  el objetivo  del estudio  fue seleccionada,  cuantiﬁcada  y analizada  siguiendo  los  conceptos  cualitativos
de  codiﬁcación  y  saturación.
Resultados:  Los  resultados  parecen  conﬁrmar  las  hipótesis  formuladas.  Todos  los  entrevistados  aportaron
evidencia  indicando  la  validez  de  las  hipótesis  1 y  2. También  se obtuvieron  diferentes  propuestas  de
incentivos  por  parte  de  todos  los  entrevistados  que  indican  la  validez  de  la  hipótesis  3.
Conclusiones:  Las  conclusiones  pueden  ser  una  guía  en  el disen˜o  de  sistemas  y  políticas  de  incentivos  ópti-
mos  en  el  seno  de  las organizaciones  sanitarias  cuando  los  profesionales  médicos  están  intrínsecamente
motivados.
cado  ©  2016  SESPAS.  Publi
ntroductionIn standard incentive theory, it is widely assumed that agents’
hoices depend only on the monetary payments with which they
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are rewarded. This is known as the price effect, which for many
decades, economic theorists have considered to be the only tool
able to incentivize economic agents. This rationalization of the
economic behaviour has been challenged in recent decades by
behavioural economics (BE).1 An extensive number of academic
works coming from BE have established that economic agents
also make their decisions based on other non-monetary motiva-
tions such as social preferences, reciprocity, and ethical values. The
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xistence of such non-monetary motivations may  have lead deci-
ion makers and managers to predict economic agents’ behaviour
oorly and to design poor incentive policies.
Intrinsic motivation has been one of the most studied non-
onetary incentives within BE.2–4 BE has established that
onetary rewards and intrinsic motivation interact sometimes
s substitutes (when incentives adversely affect agents’ intrin-
ic motivation), and sometimes as complements (when incentives
ositively affect agents’ intrinsic motivation).3 BE calls the former
he crowding-out effect and the latter the crowding-in effect. This
nterplay between monetary rewards and agents’ intrinsic moti-
ation has also been studied within self determination theory
SDT).5–7 As seen within an SDT framework, individuals are intrin-
ically motivated because they gain enjoyment from the mere fact
f doing an activity, or they get utility from the feelings of act-
ng autonomously or are self-motivated rather than controlled by
xternally imposed rewards or contingencies.8–10 Large empirical
tudies within an SDT framework have also demonstrated that
xtrinsic rewards and contingencies may  crowd out the intrin-
ic motivation.5,6 However less attention has been paid to the
rowding-in effect despite there being empirical work showing its
xistence.3
A large body of literature addresses the topic of workers’ non-
onetary motivations in the context of public and non-for-proﬁt
rganisations.11–18 In the context of health organisations some
apers analyse optimal incentives when doctors’ are intrinsically
otivated or have altruistic preferences.18–21 To our knowledge,
owever, only one such study is empirical.19 This work focuses
n ﬁnding empirical evidence about doctors’ intrinsic motivation
nd also about crowding-out and crowding-in effects. A number of
apers have been concerned with establishing a framework for the
ntrinsic motivation of health-care professionals.18–21 Within this
ramework, we seek to test the following hypotheses: 1) doctors are
ntrinsically motivated agents, 2) ﬁnancial incentives and control
nd command policies may  crowd out doctors’ intrinsic motiva-
ion, and 3) well designed incentives may  crowd in doctors’ intrinsic
otivation.
The contribution of this study is twofold:
It is new empirical research on the topic of incentives and intrinsic
motivation in the context of health organisations.
It introduces qualitative analysis to the study of incentives for
physicians in Spanish health organisations.
ethods
nterviews
We  performed in-depth semi-structured interviews á-la-Bewley
o physicians at Servicio Navarro de Salud-Osasunbidea (SNS-O,
pain)22 (N = 16). Interviews were undertaken over a sixteen-
onth period starting in February 2010. The questions addressed
o the doctors in the interviews were designed in order to test the
ypotheses formulated above. The questions open-ended and were
rounded in SDT and BE theory.
Doctors were invited to participate through a formal invita-
ion letter. The letter brieﬂy informed them about the interview
lthough no details about the research goals were given to avoid
iasing doctors’ answers. The letter was sent together with a docu-
ent stating that the results would remain anonymous. We  asked
octors to talk openly and to give their candid opinions about the
ealth organization for which they were working.
Providing enough time and comfortable place for the inter-
iew is very important in order to obtain high-quality data. We
erformed most of the interviews at the doctor’s workplace,2016;30(6):408–414 409
usually in their personal ofﬁces at a date and time of their
convenience.
The duration of the interviews ranged from a minimum of
57 minutes to a maximum of 1 hour and 44 minutes. All interviews
were performed by authors (MB  and JMC) and were recorded. We
also took ﬁeld notes, something considered relevant to improve the
quality of data. The recorded audios were transcribed to a text doc-
ument. Transcripts and notes allowed all the details of the interview
to be registered.
We  initially used random sampling of eight interviewees from
a population of senior doctors, followed by emergent sampling.24
All interviewees were doctors working at SNS-O. For the follow-
ing eight cases, we used emergent sampling making new sampling
decisions as we  gained more knowledge about the phenomena of
interest. All but one of the interviewees were senior staff, highly
qualiﬁed, in high responsibility positions, and with long tenure
within the health care system. They were mostly men  (fourteen out
of sixteen) and from a wide range of services. All but three were
working in hospitals. The remaining three were working or had
worked in a publicly outsourced private health care organization
or in public primary care centres.
Data gathering and analysis
The information was  collated and coded.23 We used three main
categories: 1) intrinsic motivation (IM), 2) crowding-out (CO), and
3) crowding-in (CI).
Each code grouped homogeneous statements —observations—
which directly referred to the same category. Codes where neces-
sary were subcoded.
Codes were of two types: deductive and inductive. Deduc-
tive codes are those which have been labelled on the basis of
existing theories —BE and SDT— prior to interviews. Inductive
codes are those which spontaneously emerge from respondents’
statements.
A descriptive analysis and some quantiﬁcation were shown
within each of the three main categories. We  found the frequency
of each code in respondents’ discourse, and linked it back to
the respondents. For each category, we  also explored interactions
between codes. Statements were classiﬁed into positive or normat-
ive. Positive statements are those that describe an actual situation
experienced by the respondent. Normative statements are those
that describe respondents’ views about how things should be in
health care organizations.
We deﬁned 32 codes where all relevant statements were
included (detailed code deﬁnitions and descriptions, considering
their inductive an deductive nature, are available for interested
readers in the Appendix online to this article). Statements and codes
have been organized in spreadsheets.
A threshold on the informative value of codes was  deﬁned based
on the concepts of saturation and hierarchy.23 A code is saturated
when it emerges repeatedly in a sufﬁcient number of interviews,
and always in the same explanatory or causal direction. The hierar-
chy criterion is applied to those codes, subcodes and subsubcodes
that do not achieve saturation but are nested into other higher level
codes which are already saturated.
Results
A total number of 642 statements concerning IM and crowding
effects were drawn from the 16 interviews. The total number of
statements is distributed as follows: 250 for IM,  214 for CO and
178 for CI. The following sections show the results separately by
category.
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Table 1
Codes of intrinsic motivation.
Code Subcode Respondents Statements (%)
Like/Enjoy 16 192 (100%)
Attractive profession 15 77 (40,10%)b
Science 13 58 (30,20%)b
Servicea 13 54 (28,12%)b
Further education 10 26 (13,54%)b
Technical knowledge 11 25 (13,02%)b
Research 8 20 (10,41%)b
Vocation 15 48 (100%)
Servicea 13 12 (25,00%)c
Help/empathy 5 11 (22,91%)c
Dedication 5 10 (20,83%)c
Effort 8 7 (14,58%)c
Pro-social/altruism 5 7 (14,58%)c
a Service is classiﬁed as a subcode for both, Like/Enjoy and Vocation. This is because doctors refer to it as an important reason for both codes.
b Numbers in subcodes add up more than the number in the code and percentages add up more than 100% because many statements of interviewees involve two or more























Ac Subcodes explaining vocation do not add up numbers above the Vocation’s one
ithin two or more codes at the same time, we leave out some statements and cod
ppendix provides a detailed description of codes.
ntrinsic motivation
All interviewed physicians reported being intrinsically moti-
ated. Doctors’ major explanations regarding IM were two: they
njoy or like the medical practice —Like/Enjoy— and they are
ocational professionals —Vocation. We  consider Like/Enjoy and
ocation the major explanations of IM because they emerge inde-
endently —they cannot be placed as subcodes of each other code.
Table 1 shows the results, including relations between IM codes
nd subcodes. Column three shows the number of respondents who
t least made one statement regarding the code or subcode dis-
layed in the same row of the table. Column four shows the number
f statements included in the code/subcode, and its percentage of
ppearance.
The main reasons for Like/Enjoy include Attractive Profes-
ion, Science, Service, Further Education, Technical Knowledge and
esearch. Most have to do with tasks featured by a technical or sci-
ntiﬁc component. We  conclude that one of the main components
f doctors’ intrinsic motivation is that medicine challenges their
ntellectual curiosity. They consider the medical profession to be a
able 2
llustrative statements of intrinsic motivation.
Codes Subcodes Quotea,b
Like/Enjoy Science, humanity . . .medical practice. . . is a
Like/Enjoy Professional
development
. . .there are stages in our 
The.  . . the ﬁrst stage, whe
that.  . . after that, you take
Vocation When, I entered in the ho
hitting from the very ﬁrst
Like/Enjoy I ﬁnd very enjoyable to le
do  things that attract you
feel  cold because you are 
Like/Enjoy Science, research,
service, teaching
Medicine is a global syste
from teaching and researc
reading or you are watchi
Vocation I remember when I entere
place.
Vocation  Service There is a vocation to serv
teaching. There is a very i
Like/Enjoy Humanity,
help/empathy
I’ve realised that people s
that I wanted to become p
worst of all pains. . . I beca
a Every statement shown in the table comes from a different respondent and have bee
b Original respondents’ statements are in Spanish. Translations of those are displayed in
o  this article in the electronic version of this paper.
ppendix provides a detailed description of codes. percentage above 100%. In this case, despite some statements were also included
ich had a little incidence.
ﬁeld where they can boost their scientiﬁc aspirations. For the case
of Vocation, the main explanations were Service, Help/Empathy,
Dedication, Effort and Pro-social/Altruism. In this case almost all
reasons belonged to the “helping others” or the humanistic part of
the medicine.
Table 2 shows a selection of representative statements relating
IM jointly with the code, subcode and subsubcode to which they
have been linked.
Results show that doctors are intrinsically motivated profes-
sionals. Their intrinsic motivation is sourced in two dimensions
featuring the medical practice: the scientiﬁc or technical dimension
and the humanistic or pro-social dimension.
Crowding-out
Evidence of the CO effect was also found. We  codiﬁed 214 state-
ments referring to CO incentives. The fact that money may hurt
doctors’ intrinsic motivation was  widely shared by all interviewees.
Table 3 shows the results and relevant codes explaining
the CO. Columns one, two  and three of the table show the
 practice in which. . . intellectual beneﬁts, affective proﬁts, are obtained quickly.
profession, you know? Then, it is nice when you are in early stages, you know?
n you are getting qualiﬁcation, you are. . . you are learning you know? But after
 responsibilities, and then. . . then. . . it is true that now I enjoy myself a lot
spital, I felt. . . ‘this is my home’, this is what I want. That is, I had the feeling of
 moment. By natural inclination, eh.
arn medicine and practice medicine while I’ve been working as a physician. You
 and, if you like windsurf [. . .] you are cold when you do windsurf but you don’t
doing windsurf.
m eh, better said the service in medicine. . . I understand medicine inseparable
h, clinic research. . . where you set out and research the problems that you are
ng. . . it is very attractive.
d in a hospital and it was  like feeling. . . that feeling that the hospital is your
ice that all of us who have done medicine have, even those who dedicate to
ntrinsic vocation for service.
uffer more from psychological problems than from physical pain. So . . . given
hysician to alleviate peoples’ suffering, and being the psychological pain the
me psychiatrist.
n selected in order to serve as a guide of the codiﬁcation process to the reader.
 the table. The reader can ﬁnd the original statements in the supplementary material
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Table  3
Codes of crowding-out.
Code Subcode Subsubcode Respondents Statements (%)
Financial incentives 16 144 (100%)
“Peonada”-FFS 14 62 (43,06%)a
Task meaning change 13 29 (46,77%)b
Market transaction 11 15 (24,19%)b
Opportunistic behaviour 7 13 (20,96%)b
Professional career-1 12 29 (20,13%)a
Lack of recognition 10 19 (65,52%)c
Task meaning change 3 4 (13,79%)c
Opportunistic behaviour 3 4 (13,79%)c
Other non-ﬁnancial 15 70 (100%)
Control 12 23 (32,85%)d
Lack of autonomy 7 12 (52,17%)e
Pressure 2 5 (21,17%)e
Bureaucratization 10 20 (28,57%)d
a Expressed as a percentage of the number of statements grouped to the Financial Incentives code.
b Expressed as a percentage of the number of statements grouped to the Peonada subcode.
c Expressed as a percentage of the number of statements grouped to the Professional career-1 subcode.
d Expressed as a percentage of the number of statements grouped to the Other non-ﬁnancial code.



















Appendix provides a detailed description of codes.
ode/subcode/subsubcode hierarchy. Column four shows the num-
er of respondents who made at least one statement linked to the
ode or subcode in the same row. The number of statements and
ercentages are shown in column ﬁve.
All statements regarding CO were classiﬁed into two  major
odes: Financial Incentives and Other Non-Financial. Peonada-FFS,
nd Professional Career-1 are subcodes of Financial Incentives.
nterviewees colloquially call “Peonada” to a Fee-For-Service (FFS)
ayment for working out-of-hours aimed to reduce waiting lists.
he main reasons through which Peonada-FFS causes CO are cap-
ured in subcodes Task Meaning Change, Market Transaction and
pportunistic Behaviour. This means that the introduction of the
FS scheme may  have caused:
A  change in the perception of the medical work from a vocational
activity to a means for seeking extra remuneration or money (task
meaning change).
Doctors to start seeing the provision of health services as market
interactions governed by market rules (market transaction).
able 4
llustrative statements of cowding-out.
Codes Subcodes Subsubcodes Quotea,b
Financial incentives Peonada-FFS Opportunistic
behaviour
The ‘peonada’












control.  . . the
Financial incentives Peonada-FFS Task meaning
change
I  don’t make ‘p








.  . .who I calle
to  perform the
going to bring
lazy, you know
a Every statement shown in the table comes from a different respondent and have been
b Original respondents’ statements are in Spanish. Translations of those are displayed i
his  paper.
ppendix provides a detailed description of codes.• Doctors to behave strategically aimed at maximising their earn-
ings (opportunistic behaviour).
Lack of Recognition, Task Meaning Change and Opportunistic
Behaviour subcodes capture the main explanations of the CO nature
of the Professional Career-1. The current professional career is hurt-
ing doctors’ IM because it recognizes neither the effort nor the
quality of their work. This is an important result, since the so called
professional career is the genuine incentive scheme in the SNS-O.
Within the non-ﬁnancial causes of CO we consider two codes:
Control and Bureaucratization. Statements under Control point out
that doctors perceive as controlling some managerial decisions
taken in the SNS-O health organizations. Doctors reported that this
hurts their IM because they feel their autonomy is constrained.
We group these Control statements within the subsubcode Lack
of Autonomy.
Finally, the last reason for CO reported by doctors is the Bureau-
cratization of the medical profession. This highlights the CO effect
caused by lack of competitive stimulus, and lack of professional
, as an incentive, [. . .] the problem is that rather than an incentive I think that it
ersion [. . .]
‘I have to climb to a higher level so then I need to attend to a course. I see uh!
 Which one grants with more points? One of otorhinolaryngology’ ‘But you are a
’t you?’ that is the kind of things that people are doing.
sultancy yes, but for carrying out things like those, autonomy? Nothing. There is
hing. We are in a over centralised system so they want to have all under
y don’t trust in anybody.
eonadas’ because I don’t believe in.  . . I don’t see myself in.  . . the money. There
sicians, and no-physicians, nurses, auxiliars and any other one who, because the
 well-paid, they ﬁnd proﬁtable to spend one or two afternoons per week doing
 they can use the money for their expenses, their son in the university, for
 But that perverts. . . perverts the system. Perverts the system
d the “stone” and the motivated are going to be paid the same. . . they are going
 same extra work, the same guards, the same. . . everything else and they are
 the same payment to their home. [. . .] in a way the system is rewarding the
?
 selected in order to serve as a guide of the codiﬁcation process to the reader.
n the table. The reader can ﬁnd the original statements in the electronic version of
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Table 5
Codes of crowding-in.
Code Subcode Subsubcode Respondents Statements (%)
Non-ﬁnancial incentives 16 170 (100%)
Professional career-2 15 44 (25,88%)a
Professional Development 15 30 (68,18%)b
Further education 9 13 (29,54%)b
Autonomy 12 45 (26,47%)a
Self-management 9 27 (60,00%)c
Recognition 16 40 (23,53%)a
Research 10 30 (17,64%)a
Teaching 6 11 (6,47%)a
a Expressed as a percentage of the number of statements grouped within the Non-ﬁnancial incentives code.
b Expressed as a percentage of the number of statements grouped within the Professional career-2 subcode.
c Expressed as a percentage of the number of statements grouped within the Autonomy subcode.
Appendix provides a detailed description of codes.
Table 6
Illustrative statements of crowding-in.





Rewards and objectives beyond the pure ﬁnancial ones should be implemented. Professional
recognition, well-done job, management and administration incentives seem to me uh. . . all these
things have to be incorporated in the professional career. It is not only about climbing to the next
level  to earn extra one hundred euros.
Non-ﬁnancial incentives Research If you are motivated, you are going to publish papers. . . you are motivated because you have a
future projection, if you are going to publish a couple of papers in Lancet, you are working in a
fascinating project, a PhD thesis, a young colleague that motivates you, a team that. . . you know!?
D*****! This. . . this. . . this is a large input of dollars. Mental dollars! Mental dollars which provide
you  of energy
Non-ﬁnancial incentives Recognition We should be recognised but recognition should be regulated someway and scored, by the
effort.  . . all of usthink that we  are the best ones, who  work the hardest, who  deserve to be
awarded all the time, but. . . this has to be [. . .]this has to be measured objectively.
Non-ﬁnancial incentives Research They shouldn’t be ﬁnancial. Rather than telling me about money if they say me, ‘we are going to
make the waiting list to disappear and you are going to be able to see all your patients from one
day to the next’, you know? ‘If that is fulﬁlled, eh, then you are going to be awarded with a clinical
trial unit, two nurses and two  data managers’[. . .] then I would see one so large carrot that. . .
aEvery statement shown in the table comes from a different respondent and have been selected in order to serve as a guide of the codiﬁcation process to the reader.
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ncentives in the context of public health organisations in the SNS-
. A selection of the most illustrative statements showing evidence
f CO is shown in Table 4.
rowding-in
Respondents made 178 statements related to the crowding-in
ategory. A fact that saturates rapidly is that non-ﬁnancial incen-
ives are the main ones to cause CI. Only a few experiences of
rowding-in were explained in the course of interviews. However
 lot of proposals and ideas of CI incentives were suggested by the
nterviewees.
Table 5 shows the codes explaining evidence for CI. Column four
hows the number of respondents who at least made one statement
inked to the code/subcode/subsubcode in the same row. Column
ve shows the number of statements and percentage of response in
rackets. The main code explaining this category is Non-Financial
ncentives which includes both, statements referring to proposals
nd to experiences. Statements referring to Non-Financial Incen-
ives were classiﬁed into ﬁve main subcodes: Professional Career-2,
utonomy, Recognition, Research and Teaching.A ﬁrst insight is that the most appropriate incentives for CI are
hose that promote the professional development of doctors such
s professional career, opportunities for research and teaching.
s evidence of the importance of setting an effective professionalcareer scheme, doctors said that a new professional career scheme
based on Professional Development and Further Education was
needed. Other CI actions like providing more autonomy for man-
aging their own  work and recognition of the achievements of their
work in terms of quality, merit or excellence based criteria, were
also reported. Doctors wished for more autonomy to manage and
organize their own work: Self-management.
Table 6 shows quotes illustrating the request for a renewed
professional career, more autonomy and other non-ﬁnancial incen-
tives.
In order to provide more consistency to the analysis performed
in the CI section, we classify doctors’ statements into normative and
positive. Then, for the CI statements we calculate the probability of
being positive P(p), or being normative P(n), obtaining the following
values: P(p) = 0.34 and P(n) = 0.66.
Discussion
To the extent of our knowledge this paper is a pioneering study
in the use of Qualitative Analysis methods in the research of incen-
tives and doctors’ intrinsic motivation in health care in Spain. It
reports on the empirical leg of a wider research on intrinsic moti-
vation in health care organisations coming from BE and SDT.
Qualitative methods are the best approach to elicit the vision
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ncentives. However, they are subject to several sources of bias in
he design of the study, the questions and the interviewers and
nterviewees. To overcome potential interviewers’ biases, inter-
iews were performed by two researchers (MB  and JC), one with
 good deal of knowledge of the health care system and the other
ore expert in the use of qualitative methods. We  realised that
hysicians are, in general, very science sensitive and familiar with
he scientiﬁc method so the fact that they feel that they are par-
icipating in a research discipline incentivise them to be rigorous.
his was conﬁrmed in recordings, transcriptions and data after-
ards.
Qualitative research performed in this work is subject to the
raditional criticism attributed to this method: people do not know
heir own motives so that what they say about them should not
e taken seriously.25 However, the point for any interview-based
ualitative analysis is that, what agents involved in a particular
henomenon say about their own motives is a kind of evidence
hat is informative about the true nature of this phenomenon.
The sample may  be constrained not only in quantitative terms
N = 16) but also in qualitative terms —interviewees are mainly
eniors and men. We  do not believe that this is a strong limitation.
nterviewees were key informants who know their organisations,
heir staff, and relationships with management and policy decision
akers fairly well. They also provided some vision of motiva-
ional changes visible in new generations and about gender-based
rowding-out/in incentives. But, even though a lot of interesting
uggestions and statements along these lines were made, we can-
ot be sufﬁciently certain about them to draw conclusions and we
ropose further research along these lines.
All proposals for policy changes of this work are based on opin-
ons and not on conﬁrmed results in real behaviour. Therefore, all
olicy implications discussed must be taken just as a suggestion,
ven though it comes from key informants of the sector and highly
ecognized stakeholders.
Results support hypotheses 1 (intrinsic motivation) and 2
crowding-out) and suggest the validity of hypothesis 3 (crowding-
n). Results also support our previous theoretical ﬁndings which
onclude that in the long run, investing in workers’ intrinsic moti-
ation is more efﬁcient than using monetary incentives.26
Our results are consistent with those obtained in the eco-
omic literature and psychology. Doctors’ reporting that they
ike and enjoy medical practice conﬁrms that they are intrinsi-
ally motivated professionals, a result in line with the classical
eﬁnition of IM.8 Moreover, ﬁnancial incentives (FFS and PC-1)
ead to a change in the perceived nature of the medical prac-
ice, which is in accordance to one of the well-established results
rom BE.3,4 Finally, control and the perceived lack of autonomy
eported by doctors as a cause of CO is consistent with results from
DT.6–9
Normative statements occur twice as frequently as positive
tatements (P(p) = 0.34 and P(n) = 0.66). This result suggests that
hysicians currently perceive a need for change toward a more
otivating incentive schemes, managerial policies and organiza-
ional issues. There is much more work to do in the ﬁeld than what is
urrently done in the SNS-O. We  do not present normative/positive
nalyses for CO because asking about what should be done to design
O incentives makes no sense.
Our results about doctors’ intrinsic motivation and possible
rowding-out and crowding-in effects do not suggest that only
ntrinsic motivation matters. We  tried to throw some light on how
onetary payments and rewards should be combined with other
on-ﬁnancial incentives in order to incentivize doctors for perfor-
ance, quality of service supply and career development, when the
ntrinsic motivation plays a role.
This work is a step forward in the optimal design of incentive
chemes and policies which crowd in doctors’ intrinsic motivation.2016;30(6):408–414 413
Some proposals for changes and incentives made by doctors emerge
from the analysis. Health care policy should consider focusing on:
1) facilities to engage in scientiﬁc and research activities: clini-
cal trials, technical assistance, conferences attendance and so on;
2) activities involving professional development: further educa-
tion stays in centres or institutions of excellence, teaching and
the like; 3) more autonomy to organize own work, to self-manage
and to set and agree objectives jointly with colleagues and with
the management; 4) recognition at the workplace: the need for a
renewed professional career designed with clear criteria to reward
professional excellence. Given our ﬁndings, we recommend the
development of further studies in this context that might help to
future design, implementation and evaluation of new and innova-
tive systems of incentives in health care organisations. Incentives in
health care in Spain are narrowly focused on ﬁnancial rewards and
this research should serve as a ﬁrst step to cast doubt on whether
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